Utilities Governance, Incentives, and Performance: Evidence from the Water Sector in India by Nyathikala, S. et al.
                                                               
                                   
 
 
 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics: 1861 
UTILITIES GOVERNANCE, INCENTIVES, AND 
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE WATER 
SECTOR IN INDIA 
 
Sai Amulya 
Nyathikala 
Tooraj 
Jamasb 
Manuel 
Llorca 
Mukul 
Kulshrestha 
    
 
24 October 2018 
 
Network utilities across the world are subject to regulation and political scrutiny. In 
developing countries, managing the trade-offs between socioeconomic and environmental 
objectives in public water and energy utilities is particularly challenging. These industries 
share important underlying technical and economic features. Therefore, many economic, 
governance, and policy lessons are transferable across these sectors. In India, the water 
sector suffers from mounting financial losses, lack of access, and poor quality of service. 
There is a dearth of literature on the multi-faceted nature of utility performance related to 
water utilities. We examine the socioeconomic and environmental aspects of urban water 
supply in India. We use a stochastic frontier analysis approach and distance functions to 
analyse the performance of 304 urban water supply utilities in three Indian states during the 
period 2010-2015. The results suggest that incentive-based economic reform and regulation 
would help the utilities improve their performance. More specifically measures to improve 
cost recovery, billing efficiency and reduce losses would help the utilities to enhance service 
delivery, expand coverage and induce efficiency in the sector. The results also show the 
dependence of water utilities on groundwater sources which is unsustainable in the long 
run. We highlight the need for designing economic incentives to improve the performance 
of utilities and enable them to achieve social and sustainability objectives. 
 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
 
Faculty of Economics 
  
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
 
Utilities Governance, Incentives, and 
Performance: Evidence from the Water Sector 
in India 
EPRG Working Paper      1832 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics      1861 
Sai Amulya Nyathikala, Tooraj Jamasb, Manuel 
Llorca, Mukul Kulshrestha 
 
Abstract  
Network utilities across the world are subject to regulation and political scrutiny. In developing 
countries, managing the trade-offs between socioeconomic and environmental objectives in 
public water and energy utilities is particularly challenging. These industries share important 
underlying technical and economic features. Therefore, many economic, governance, and 
policy lessons are transferable across these sectors. In India, the water sector suffers from 
mounting financial losses, lack of access, and poor quality of service. There is a dearth of 
literature on the multi-faceted nature of utility performance related to water utilities. We 
examine the socioeconomic and environmental aspects of urban water supply in India. We use 
a stochastic frontier analysis approach and distance functions to analyse the performance of 
304 urban water supply utilities in three Indian states during the period 2010-2015. The results 
suggest that incentive-based economic reform and regulation would help the utilities improve 
their performance. More specifically measures to improve cost recovery, billing efficiency and 
reduce losses would help the utilities to enhance service delivery, expand coverage and induce 
efficiency in the sector. The results also show the dependence of water utilities on groundwater 
sources which is unsustainable in the long run. We highlight the need for designing economic 
incentives to improve the performance of utilities and enable them to achieve social and 
sustainability objectives. 
 
Keywords  Governance and regulation; socioeconomic and environmental 
performance; stochastic frontier analysis; sustainability; urban water supply in India. 
 
JEL Classification L97, L95, L51, L43, R52. 
Contact saiamulya32166@gmail.com  
Publication  October 2018 
Financial Support Commonwealth Scholarship Commission funding the collaboration between 
Durham University and National Institute of Technology, Bhopal 
1 
 
Utilities Governance, Incentives, and Performance: 
Evidence from the Water Sector in India 
 
Sai Amulya Nyathikala 
a, b, c
 
Tooraj Jamasb 
a
 
Manuel Llorca 
a
 
Mukul Kulshrestha 
b 
 
23 October 2018 
 
Abstract 
Network utilities across the world are subject to regulation and political scrutiny. In 
developing countries, managing the trade-offs between socioeconomic and environmental 
objectives in public water and energy utilities is particularly challenging. These industries 
share important underlying technical and economic features. Therefore, many economic, 
governance, and policy lessons are transferable across these sectors. In India, the water 
sector suffers from mounting financial losses, lack of access, and poor quality of service. 
There is a dearth of literature on the multi-faceted nature of utility performance related to 
water utilities. We examine the socioeconomic and environmental aspects of urban water 
supply in India. We use a stochastic frontier analysis approach and distance functions to 
analyse the performance of 304 urban water supply utilities in three Indian states during the 
period 2010-2015. The results suggest that incentive-based economic reform and regulation 
would help the utilities improve their performance. More specifically measures to improve 
cost recovery, billing efficiency and reduce losses would help the utilities to enhance service 
delivery, expand coverage and induce efficiency in the sector. The results also show the 
dependence of water utilities on groundwater sources which is unsustainable in the long run. 
We highlight the need for designing economic incentives to improve the performance of 
utilities and enable them to achieve social and sustainability objectives. 
 
Keywords: Governance and regulation; socioeconomic and environmental performance; 
stochastic frontier analysis; sustainability; urban water supply in India. 
JEL Classifications : L97, L95, L51, L43, R52. 
___________________________________________ 
a
 Durham University Business School, Durham University, United Kingdom 
b
 Environmental Engineering Division, Department of Civil Engineering, National Institute of 
Technology, MANIT-Bhopal, India. 
c
 Corresponding author: Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, 
United Kingdom; Department of Civil Engineering, National Institute of Technology, MANIT-
Bhopal, 462003, India. E-mail: saiamulya32166@gmail.com. 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission for funding the 
collaboration between Durham University and National Institute of Technology, Bhopal.  
2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Network utilities such as water, electricity, gas and telecommunication develop and operate 
essential infrastructure services and play a key role in the social and economic development 
of cities and countries (Marvin and Graham, 1993; Loughlin, 1985; Simpson, 1983; CEC, 
1990). These industries, although different in various ways, are natural monopolies that share 
important underlying technical and economic features. This implies that many economic, 
governance, and policy evidence and lessons are transferable across them. 
 
Water supply utilities across the world need to achieve a diverse set of social welfare, 
economic efficiency, and environmental performance objectives (Venkatesh et al., 2015). 
However, managing the trade-offs between these objectives in developing countries, in the 
context of weak institutions and independent regulatory tradition, is a difficult task. 
 
There are strong political interests directing policies towards social objectives leaving behind 
the economic and environmental concerns. Water prices are generally not determined in 
markets and, as such, do not reflect resource scarcity (Olmstead, 2010). In consequence, there 
has been a discernible absence of policy to provide incentives that may encourage efficient 
water usage, and a lack of thrust on conserving water (Kulshrestha et al., 2012).
1
 Allocation 
mechanisms are highly political, and even when faced with resource scarcity, management 
institutions are reluctant to raise prices (Olmstead, 2010). As a result, most utilities operate 
with financial losses implying continued dependence on government subsidies, and poor 
access to services and quality. The literature suggests that, as a result, public firms have 
distorted objective functions that also involve the pursuit of politician’s individual goals by 
transfer of value to voters at the expense of other objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 
1994). Examples of this type of political interference in public utilities in India are abundant 
(see Dubash and Rajan, 2001; Dubash and Rao, 2007; Dubash, 2008; Singh, 2014). 
 
Universal access to water remains a very relevant issue in urban India. Urban water supplies 
are state-controlled monopolies whose policies are focused on drinking water provisioning 
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 Due to the lack of recognition as an economic good, water has conventionally been considered as a free 
commodity and large quantities of potable water are employed for non-potable uses (Kulshrestha et al., 2012). 
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for their growing populations. However, these are less concerned with long-term 
sustainability, efficiency and commercial viability of the utilities (Nyathikala and Kulshrestha, 
2017). As a result, while the connected households have significant issues in terms of 
quantity, quality of supply and service, the remaining 40% of urban households does not have 
access to public piped water supply (IIHS, 2014). 
 
During the past decade and a half, India has sought reforms in the water sector on two fronts: 
i) economic/financial reforms and ii) governance/institutional reforms. These reforms are 
based on principles of full cost recovery, rationalisation of tariffs, introduction of public-
private partnerships and establishment of regulatory authorities (MoUD and PA, 2004; 
MoWR, 2016; MoUD, 2012).
2
 As frequently highlighted, the process of initiating and 
undertaking reforms is disjointed at various levels of governance institutions resulting in no 
major improvements in service delivery (Wagle et al., 2011; Kulshrestha et al., 2012). The 
literature suggests that the quality of institutions affects productivity and economic 
performance of utilities and constrain them from realising their technical potential (Jamasb et 
al., 2018; Borghi et al., 2016).  
 
The absence of national level regulator and the prevalence of fragmented governance 
structures makes it difficult for Indian water supply sector to achieve various reform 
objectives across different states.
3
 Other utility sectors operating under fragmented set ups 
and political intervention can face similar constraints, where reforms seem to lack the 
mechanisms for achieving policy objectives. This highlights the need to assess the 
performance of utility networks and their determinants. The Indian urban water supply sector 
provides a suitable case for such a study. 
 
                                                          
2
 The draft National water framework bill, 2016, released by the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) 
discusses water pricing and suggests a graded pricing system, with full cost-reflective pricing for domestic water 
supplies for high-income groups (MoWR, 2016). Further, an advisory note on improving urban water supply 
and sanitation, from Ministry of Urban Development, recommends the states to set up regulatory mechanisms 
through an independent authority for setting standards, monitoring performance and adjusting tariffs (MoUD, 
2012). 
3
 The institutional set up in Indian water supplies is currently characterised by the absence of National level 
water regulatory authority and the emergence of state-level Independent Water Regulatory Authorities is a 
recent phenomenon shaping up in at least seven states (Swaniti, 2016). Further, most of the state water 
regulatory authorities do not include provisions for regulating water service provisioning and are solely named 
as water resource regulatory authorities (see PRAYAS, 2009). Moreover, the existence of multiple institutions 
and lack of co-ordination results in duplication and ambiguity of functions and hinders fixing up of 
responsibility for failure to implement stated policy (Kulshrestha et al., 2012). 
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This paper analyses the performance of Indian urban water supply utilities in 3 states from 
2010-11 to 2015-16 considering socioeconomic and environmental aspects.
4
 We use a 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach to estimate a multi-input multi-output distance 
function. The paper specifically focuses on: 
 
i. Evaluating the performance of Indian urban water supply utilities taking into account 
social, economic and environmental dimensions, 
ii. Examining the economic characteristics of sector’s technology and the impact of 
specific factors on utilities’ performance, 
iii. Assessing the behaviour of the utilities based on the type of incentives relative to the 
results obtained from the analysis, and 
iv. Drawing policy recommendations concerning the sector and its reforms. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a synopsis of the literature on the 
performance of the water supply sector and focuses on the Indian case. Section 3 describes 
the methodology of the study. Section 4 reports the results and discussion of results from a 
policy perspective. Section 5 is concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review on Water Utility Performance 
 
Efficiency and productivity analysis studies are common in networks, distribution, 
manufacturing, regulated, service industries, public sector, and academic research to measure 
performance, minimise costs, improve service delivery, and ensure greater accountability (see 
Coelli and Lawrence, 2006). Kulshrestha and Vishwakarma (2013) and Vishwakarma et al. 
(2016) are examples of literature reviews about the broad application of performance 
assessment in different sectors. These studies show application of nonparametric (such as 
Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) and parametric (such as SFA) methods across various 
sectors in different parts of Asia, Africa, Europe, America and Australia. 
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 India is composed of 29 states and 7 union territories. The present study includes three Indian states (Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, and Chhattisgarh) due to data restrictions. These three states represent 18% of the total water 
connections in India (MHUPA, 2013) and reflect the structural, technical and economic features of the Indian 
urban water supply sector. Further, they portray the way water utilities operate in the country. The results from 
the present study provide useful lessons to improve urban water supply services in all states. Additionally, many 
economic, governance and policy recommendations are transferable across the states. 
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These methods are used by sector regulators for tariff and revenue setting, assessing the 
effectiveness of reforms and social and economic policies (Jamasb et al., 2006; Li and 
Waddams, 2012). Much emphasis has been laid on improving water supply services and 
hence on performance measurements in US, UK and parts of Europe since the 1970s.
5
 Abbott 
and Cohen (2009) summarise the performance measurement studies in water sector over the 
period 1969-2007 across UK, USA, parts of Europe and Australia. The study reviews the 
various measures used to gauge productivity and efficiency and summarises the key structural 
findings on economies of scale and scope, public versus private ownership and the impact of 
regulation. 
 
Most studies are focused on the effect of ownership arrangements (public vs private), changes 
in regulation, and governance on performance (see Guerrini et al., 2011). These studies 
further investigate scale and scope economies of water utilities (see Carvalho et al., 2012; 
Mercadier et al., 2016), choice of public versus private considering factors such as cost of 
funds, differences in efficiency scores, transaction costs, and political cost of privatisation 
(see Perard, 2009). Recent studies also include service quality recognising its social, political, 
economic and environmental implications (see Romano et al., 2017). The importance of 
including quality measures in cost minimisation studies of water utilities is highlighted by 
Lin (2005) and Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), as a higher quality is associated with higher costs 
and the difference between conventional and quality-adjusted evaluations viewed as the 
opportunity cost of maintaining quality. 
 
On the other hand, recent theoretical and empirical studies examined the relevance of 
structures and institutions to public utility performance and stressed the importance of the 
institutional environment on performance (Borghi et al., 2016). Beecher (2013) examined the 
effect of structural and institutional dimensions on performance focusing on US water sector. 
The model includes three structural dimensions (ownership type, practice standards, and 
enterprise autonomy) and three institutional dimensions (market contestability, external 
review, and economic regulation) in the analysis. In summary, the study suggests that each of 
the dimensions may be complementary or substitutive while a pragmatic approach is to 
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 Performance measurement of water utilities has become a standard practice in developed countries due the 
presence of a dedicated sector regulator as water supplies evolved in the form of an industry with increasing 
private participation as in other network industries (Kulshrestha, 2005; CEPT, 2013). 
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strengthen the core governance capacities which ultimately matter most in relation to 
performance priorities. 
 
2.1 Studies in the Indian Water Supply Sector 
As highlighted by Berg and Marques (2011), research on water utility performance is not a 
high-status activity in comparison to other sectors and data availability affects the pace and 
patterns of analysis. This has been particularly the case in developing countries (especially in 
Asia), because of the lack of appropriate data, and above that the water supplies are yet to 
take on the form of an industry. The absence of a sector regulator also discourages 
performance measurement in the sector. 
 
Performance measurement in Indian water sector has mainly been limited to researchers and 
was not inbuilt in the system, unlike many developed nations.
6
 Although there have been 
efforts to measure performance of Indian urban water utilities by national and international 
organisations (e.g., CPHEEO, 2005; ADB, 2007; World Bank, 2008) their purposes have 
ranged from providing baseline information to exploring the use of benchmarking practices 
and are mostly one-time efforts using different set of indicators in each study. Thus, there 
was no common ground on which the performances of utilities could be measured to monitor 
progress and develop accountability. With the introduction of Service Level Benchmarks 
(SLBs) by the Ministry of Urban Development in 2008 (MoUD, 2009), a weighted index 
approach (wherein each indicator is given equal weight) is used to assess the performance of 
utilities with respect to service level indicators (see PAS, 2014). However, this approach does 
not give much information about the utilities in terms of operations, expenditures, and 
efficiency which are important from a sustainability viewpoint. 
 
Table 1 summarises the studies on the performance of Indian urban water sector. An early 
attempt to lay down a framework for efficiency evaluation was initiated by Kulshrestha 
(2005). The study used cross-sectional data from the year 1999 for the analysis and other 
                                                          
6
 A number of water and waste water utility associations and regulatory agencies across the world have used 
different benchmarking methods since the late 1990’s to assess performances, increase competitiveness, and to 
improve efficiency in water supply, sewerage operations and service delivery. This has mainly been the case in 
Latin America, most of Europe, Australia, Mozambique, and Zambia. Other countries such as Brazil, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Ecuador, and Uganda adopted these methods to measure the progress of selected government 
initiatives with respect to water supply and sewerage and prioritise funding options (CEPT, 2010). 
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authors have subsequently used the same data (e.g., Kulshrestha, 2006; 2009; Singh et al., 
2010; 2011; 2014). Some recent studies use a limited number of utilities and have focused on 
efficiency measurements and cost-saving. This reflects the data constraints in Indian water 
supply as highlighted by most studies in Table 1. Further, these studies have mostly relied on 
a DEA approach due to its simplicity and the imposition of fewer assumptions on the shape 
of firm’s technology.7 
 
Singh et al. (2010, 2011) added the sustainability dimension to the analysis whereas Kumar 
and Mangi (2010), Tiwari and Gulati (2011), Nag and Garg (2013) incorporated a quality 
dimension in their analysis. Vishwakarma et al. (2016) used SFA to evaluate cost efficiencies 
of Indian water utilities. The study used cross-sectional data on a limited number of utilities 
(18) and focuses solely on one state (Madhya Pradesh). Further, the study is limited to a 
narrow set of indicators (exclusive of quality measures) due to data restrictions thereby 
affecting policy decisions needed to improve performance of the sector. Further, Nyathikala 
and Kulshrestha (2017) was the first attempt to develop a framework to measure X-factors for 
a possible sector regulation. The study used panel data to measure performance and 
productivity of Indian water supply utilities. 
 
Most reform programs in Indian urban water sector are introduced since 2004 as a means to 
achieve Millennium Development Goals (MoUD and PA, 2004). The above studies mostly 
rely on cross-sectional data from 1999 portraying the past setup of the sector. Studies that use 
recent data (2002, 2005, 2010, and 2012) have been restricted to a particular year due to the 
lack of consistent indicator base (see Table 1). Although, Nyathikala and Kulshrestha (2017) 
measure performance of Indian water utilities using 1999 and 2010 data, the study could not 
measure their performance along different dimensions of reforms. The study also highlighted 
the issues of consistency in the data. 
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 Moreover, DEA also avoids convergence issues and the well-known “wrong-skewness” problem in the SFA 
literature. 
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Table 1. Summary of studies of performance of Indian water utilities 
Study 
Utilities 
Count 
Period Methodology Description 
Kulshrestha 
(2005, 2009) 
147 1999 
Input-oriented 
DEA and 
Scorecard 
Earliest attempts to develop two frameworks to 
measure performances in the water supply 
operations. The study evaluates possible savings in 
Opex and Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) 
Kulshrestha 
(2006) 
5 cities 1999 Scorecard 
Proposes a generic framework to formulate a 
scorecard to measure performances using a specific 
set of indicator clusters. 
 
 
 
 
indicator clusters 
Gupta et al. 
(2006, 2012) 
27 2004-05 
Output-oriented 
DEA 
First attempt to use the concept of total factor 
productivity to estimate technical efficiencies within 
two groups (municipal corporations and parastatals) 
 Singh et al. 
(2010) 
18 1999 
Input-oriented 
DEA 
Added sustainability dimension to the analysis. 
Singh et al. 
(2011) 
35 1999 Input-oriented 
DEA 
Sustainability-based performance assessment. 
Kumar and 
Mangi (2010) 
20 2005 DEA 
Incorporated quality dimension to performance 
analysis using variables such as Accounted-for 
Water (AFW), hours of supply and quality of water. 
 
 
Tiwari and 
Gulati (2011) 
31 cities 2005 DEA 
Analyses performance in the delivery of services. 
Kulshrestha and 
Vishwakarma 
(2013) 
20 2010 
Input-oriented 
DEA 
Evaluates relative inefficiencies in water supply 
services and estimates possible savings in Opex, 
UFW and Staff. 
Nag and Garg 
(2013) 
127 2002 DEA Measures performance in water service delivery. 
Singh et al. 
(2014) 
12 1999 DEA and 
Index Method 
Compares and analyses the efficiency scores using 
two methods. 
Vishwakarma et 
al. (2016) 
18 2010 
SFA (Cost 
function) 
Evaluates cost efficiencies and estimates possible 
savings in operating and maintenance costs. 
Jaladhi et al. 
(2016) 
+400 cities 2010-2015 
Indicator to 
Indicator 
comparisons 
Developed an online interface to track performances 
of each utility with respect to benchmarks set by 
MoUD (2009) over time. 
Gill and Nema 
(2016) 
311 2012 DEA 
First attempt to develop a framework to explore 
efficiencies and measure performances in rural 
utilities. 
Nyathikala and 
Kulshrestha 
(2017) 
21 
1999 and 
2010 
Malmquist-DEA 
First study using panel data to measure performance 
and productivity. Developed a framework to 
measure X-factors for possible sector regulation 
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Additionally, at a global level there are very few multidimensional performance studies of 
utility networks in general and in water supplies in particular. The review of the literature at 
present identified only two studies (Singh et al., 2010; 2011), that focus on multi-dimensional 
performance analysis of water supply utilities. Although the variables used in Singh et al. 
(2010, 2011) are incorporated in most efficiency evaluation studies (see Romano et al., 2017), 
the focus of these studies were to assess performance accounting for service quality and not 
on multi-dimensional performance analysis. The indicators thus used in the studies 
summarised by Romano et al. (2017) include quality measures in their analysis (see Lin, 2005; 
Romano et al., 2017) and are not specifically grouped in to multiple dimensions. Singh et al. 
(2010, 2011) estimate performance of Indian urban water utilities incorporating a range of 
sustainability parameters grouped in to key sustainability dimensions (social, environmental 
and financial). These studies used cross-sectional data from the year 1999 and made use of 
DEA to estimate multi-dimensional performance of Indian water utilities. As in many other 
studies, the study was restricted to a limited number of utilities (18 utilities in Singh et al., 
2010; 35 utilities in Singh et al., 2011) and to a particular year due to data restrictions, and 
depicts the past set up and performance of the sector. 
 
Recently, Jaladhi et al. (2016) provided a platform to compare the progress of water utilities 
with respect to service level benchmarks (SLBs) set by MoUD (2009) over time (2010-2016). 
We use this data in the first panel data multi-dimensional (socio-economic and environmental) 
performance analysis of Indian urban water supply utilities. Although, the present study 
seems to be on a similar note to that of Singh et al. (2010, 2011), we use different set of 
indicators to capture multiple dimensions of reform objectives and analyse the performance 
of water supply utilities using a recent panel data set over the period 2010-2015.
8
 Our study 
further examines the conduct of the utilities with a view to design better governance and 
incentives to improve efficiency in the sector. 
 
                                                          
8
 The reform programmes and central government policies introduced in the Indian urban water sector during 
the period 2007-2017 (Planning Commission, 2008; MoUD, 2012; NITI Aayog, 2017) focused on the aspects of 
universal access, full cost recovery, reducing losses, improving service delivery and incorporating efficient 
water management practices at all levels of water uses. Therefore, it is important that the current study 
incorporates multiple dimensions of reform objectives to evaluate performance of water supply utilities. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Definition of an Output-Oriented Distance Function 
This section describes the methodology adopted in this paper to analyse the performance of 
Indian urban water supply utilities. This approach enables us to examine some economic 
characteristics of the sector’s technology. In general terms, the production technology P(x) of 
the sector can be defined as: 
P(x) = {y ∈ R
+
M: x can produce y}                                                                                            (1) 
where x denotes a non-negative vector of inputs(x ∈ R+
k ), y denotes a non-negative vector of 
outputs, (y ∈ R+
M) and P(x) represents the output possibility set which is assumed to satisfy 
the axioms listed in Fare (1988). 
 
Distance functions provide a characterisation of production technology when multiple inputs 
are used to produce multiple outputs. They may be specified as input-oriented or output-
oriented. The input-oriented approach has been adopted by most studies of performance of 
Indian urban water sector (see Table 1). However, this approach may be not appropriate for 
decentralised governance systems such as the Indian water supply sector,
9
 where the prime 
objective of local authorities has been to extend the capacity and water service to meet the 
unmet demand of a developing economy and growing population. An output-oriented 
approach, i.e., the maximisation of outputs from a given level of resources, is theoretically 
appropriate and compatible with the objectives of the authorities.
10
 Therefore, we use an 
output-oriented distance function to characterise the production technology of the sector. 
 
An output distance function takes an output expanding approach to the measurement of the 
distance from a producer to the boundary of production possibilities. It gives the minimum 
amount, θ, by which an output vector can be deflated and remain producible with a given 
input vector (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). 
                                                          
9
 The 74
th
 Amendment to the Constitution of India, 1992 (Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992) 
required the state governments to constitute urban local entities in the form of various municipal level bodies for 
decentralised administration and accordingly the primary responsibility for providing drinking water services 
rests with the State Governments, and, more specifically, with the local bodies in urban areas. The Central 
government provides funds and ensures that funds are also provided in State budgets. 
10
The government has announced an ambitious target of providing universal water coverage by 2019 (MoEF and 
UNDP, 2015) and the Twelfth plan (2012-2017) aims for 100% coverage, provision of piped and 24×7 supply 
(Planning commission, 2013). 
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The output distance function, as introduced by Shephard (1970), is defined on the output set, 
P(x), as: 
DO(x,y)=min {θ:(
y
θ⁄ ) ∈ P(x)}                                                                                                (2) 
The distance function, DO(x,y), is non-decreasing in y and non-increasing in x, and linearly 
homogenous and convex in y. It takes a value less than or equal to one if the output vector, y, 
is an element of the feasible production set, P(x), and will take a value of unity if y is located 
on the “frontier” of the production possibility set (Coelli and Perelman, 1996). 
 
3.1.1 Choice of the Functional Form 
In a parametric framework such as SFA, one of the first decisions is the selection of an 
appropriate functional form which would be ideally flexible, easy to calculate and permit the 
imposition of homogeneity. It is also convenient to choose a functional form that expresses 
the log-distance as a linear function of inputs and outputs. 
 
The present study makes use of both the Cobb-Douglas and Translog specifications to 
estimate the parameters of the model. The Cobb-Douglas distance function for the case of M 
outputs and K inputs can be specified as: 
ln DOi = α0+ ∑ αm ln ymi
M
m=1 + ∑ βk
K
k=1 ln xki,     i = 1,…,N                                                   (3) 
where i denotes the i
th
 observation in the sample, and α and β are the coefficients to be 
estimated. The more flexible standard translog distance function is expressed as: 
ln DOi= α0+ ∑ αm ln ymi +
1
2
∑ ∑ αmq
M
q=1 ln ymi ln yqi+ ∑ βk ln xki
K
k=1
M
m=1
M
m=1   
+ 
1
2
∑ ∑ βkl ln xki ln xli+ ∑ ∑ ρkm ln xki ln ymi
M
m=1
K
k=1
K
l=1
K
k=1 ,     i = 1,…,N                    (4) 
where ρ  represents the additional coefficients to be estimated that are linked with the 
interaction between inputs and outputs. A convenient method of imposing the homogeneity 
of degree +1 in outputs upon Equation (4) is presented by Lovell et al. (1994). Homogeneity 
implies that: 
DO(x,ωy)=ωDO(x,y)     for any ω>0                                                                                       (5) 
12 
 
Hence if we arbitrarily choose one output (e.g., the M-th output), and set ω = 1 yM⁄ , we 
obtain: 
DO(x, y yM⁄ )= DO(x,y) yM⁄                                                                                                       (6) 
By using this property in the context of a translog specification (represented here by TL) such 
as the one expressed in Equation (4), we obtain: 
ln(DOi yMi⁄ )=TL(xi, yi yMi⁄ , α,β,ρ)                                                                                           (7) 
After rearranging terms we obtain: 
- ln(yMi)=TL(xi, yi yMi⁄ , α,β,ρ) - ln(DOi),     i=1,…,N                                                            (8) 
The SFA literature starting from Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) 
highlights that deviations between actual firms’ production (cost) functions should be 
attributed to random shocks and managerial inefficiency. These seminal papers proposed a 
specification that includes two random terms that capture both sources of deviations. By 
incorporating a symmetric error term, vit , to capture statistical noise in Equation (6) and 
changing the notation of -ln(DOit) to uit, which accounts for technical inefficiency, we obtain 
a stochastic output distance function that can be presented as: 
-ln(yMi)=TL(xi, yi yMi⁄ , α,β,ρ)+vi+ui,     i=1,…,N                                                                 (9) 
where vi follows a normal distribution and is independently and identically distributed (iid), 
i.e., vi~N(0, σv
2) , and ui is a non-negative iid random term that follows a half-normal 
distribution, i.e., ui~N
+(0, σu
2), and captures the technical inefficiency of the utilities. 
 
3.1.2 Introduction of Inefficiency Determinants 
In order to examine the factors causing inefficiency, several heteroscedastic models that 
allow to introduce inefficiency determinants have been developed in the SFA literature.
11
 In 
this paper we use the approach proposed by Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Caudill and 
Ford (1993) and Caudill et al. (1995) (commonly referred to as RSCFG model). The specific 
                                                          
11
 For a brief summary see Llorca et al. (2016). 
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characteristic of this type of model is that satisfies the scaling property, i.e., changes in the 
inefficiency determinants affect the scale but not the shape of ui (Alvarez et al., 2006). 
 
In the RSCFG model, the inefficiency term, uit, can be decomposed as follows: 
uit(zit, δ)=h(zit, δ)uit
*                                                                                                             (10) 
where h(zit, δ)  is a scaling function that is always positive and presents an exponential 
functional form, zit represents the inefficiency determinants, δ  is the additional set of 
parameters to be estimated and uit
∗  is a measure of raw inefficiency that does not depend on zit 
and follows a half-normal distribution. By substituting Equation (10) in (9) the output 
distance function that we obtain can be expressed as: 
-ln(yMit)=TL(xit, yit yMit⁄ , α,β,ρ) +vit + h(zit, δ)uit
*                                                               (11) 
 
3.2 Model Specification and Data 
3.2.1 Dimensions of Analysis and Selection of Input and Outputs 
The indicators used in this paper are classified into five different groups based on 
socioeconomic and environmental dimensions. Keeping in view major reform programs 
introduced in Indian urban water supply sector, Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 
targets and action plans formulated by the Government of India,
12
 it is important to analyse 
the performance of water supply services in these three major dimensions and comprehend 
the trade-offs between social, economic and environmental objectives. Table 2 presents the 
input and output variables used in the present study. 
 
A detailed definition of the variables is presented in Appendix A. These set of variables are 
adopted from benchmarking literature in the water supply sector which included 
                                                          
12
 During the past decade, the Indian water supply sector has seen major economic reforms and the recent three-
year (2017-2019) action plan of the Government of India emphasises on achieving continuous piped water 
supply to every household and calls for state level specific policies to restructure the pricing mechanisms and 
enhance financial viability of the sector through cost reflective pricing (NITI Aayog, 2017). Further, the SDG 
targets aspire to achieve universal and equitable access, improve water quality, ensure sustainable withdrawals 
and protect water related ecosystems (UN, 2015). The goals and targets are multi-dimensional in nature as it is 
important to understand the trade-offs between social, economic and environmental objectives to ensure 
sustainability in the water sector. 
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sustainability and quality dimensions in the analysis (see Singh et al., 2010; Romano et al., 
2017). An additional variable included in the present study that has not been considered in the 
literature before is groundwater. This variable is a resource use indicator to reflect the degree 
of reliance of utilities on groundwater sources and environmental sustainability as a part of 
resource conservation practice.
13
 It is defined as the share of groundwater with respect to total 
water supplied. 
 
Table 2. Input, Outputs, Indicator Groups and Dimensions of Analysis 
Inputs Outputs Indicator Groups Dimension 
 Operating 
Expenditure 
Opex (Rs) 
 
 Capital  
Expenditure  
Capex (Rs) 
 Total water supplied (MLD) 
 Total water connections (No.s) 
Access 
Social 
 Supply hours (Hrs) 
Quality of supply / 
Supply reliability 
 Complaint efficiency (%) Service efficiency  
 Efficiency in bill collections (%) 
 Cost recovery (%) 
Financial viability Economic 
 Groundwater (%) 
 Extent of non-revenue water (%) 
Environmental 
sustainability 
Environmental 
Note: MLD: Million Litres Per day; Rs= INR=Indian Rupees; Hrs= Hours per day. 
 
In addition, we introduce two dummy variables (SD1 and SD2) to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity existing between the three states where the utilities of our sample are located. 
Further, we use  a time trend variable, t, which interacts with the other variables in the model 
allowing the estimation to capture non-neutral technical change. 
 
                                                          
13
 It should be noted that unregulated ground water withdrawals and the absence of abstraction charges is a 
major sustainability issue concerning Indian water supply sector (see Kulshrestha et al., 2012). In fact, India 
ranks 1
st
 among top 10 ground water abstraction countries, with an average abstraction rate of 251 km
3
/year 
(IGRAC, 2010). This spells problems for water supplies in the long run due to rapidly falling groundwater 
tables, increased abstraction costs and pollution of aquifers. 
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3.3.2 Inefficiency Determinants  
As mentioned earlier it is important to identify the determinants of inefficiency in the sector 
in order to understand the impact caused by specific factors on the performance of the sector 
and the utilities. The present study examines the effect of both physical and financial 
indicators on utilities’ performance using two models. Table 3 shows the inefficiency 
determinants included in both models. Model I captures the effect of physical variables on the 
utilities’ performance and on a similar note, Model II captures the effect of financial variables 
on the utilities’ performance. 
 
Table 3. Models of Inefficiency Determinants 
Model I 
(Physical Indicators) 
Model II 
(Financial Indicators) 
 Quality of water supplied (ws_qlty) (%) 
 Extent of Non- Revenue Water (nrw) (%) 
 Cost Recovery (cr) (%) 
 Billing efficiency (bill_eff) (%) 
 
These indicators used in our analysis are specifically selected taking into account the 
particular features of the Indian urban water supply sector, their issues and challenges as 
mentioned by Kulshrestha et al. (2012) and examining the database provided by PAS (2017). 
Amongst the various issues concerning the Indian urban water supplies, the variables 
presented in Model I and Model II reflects several technical and financial shortcomings in the 
sector (see Kulshrestha et al., 2012; IIHS, 2014; Prabhu, 2012 and WaterAid India, 2005). 
Model I captures two major technical issues concerning the sector which are the quality of 
the water supplied and the non-revenue water.
14
  
 
Another key factor affecting water situation in India since past decade is the absence of cost 
reflective pricing leading to low coverage (often leaving the poor unconnected), poor service 
delivery (intermittent supplies), high subsidies and unsustainable and inefficient use of water. 
Model II captures the financial shortcomings in the sector using two variables: cost recovery 
                                                          
14
 One of the biggest issues concerning Indian urban water supplies particularly at the household level remains 
that of water contamination, and its consequent impact on health and human wellbeing. Even though the water 
supplied through public systems is treated as per the standards, contamination occurs in the systems due to 
leakage before it reaches consumer end owing to lack of monitoring. 
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and billing efficiency. The variables used in both the models (Model I and Model II) are 
utility-specific and of relevance to local authorities and utility managers to fulfil several 
reform objectives. This paper explores the link between the above specified indicators and 
utilities’ performance by introducing them as environmental variables in the inefficiency term 
of the RSCFG model (see Equation 11). This will help us observe the effect of each indicator 
on utilities’ performance and provide a way to prioritise factors on which utilities should 
focus to improve their performance and achieve targets. 
 
3.4 Data 
We use an unbalanced panel data set including information on 304 utilities over a total of 462 
which operate in 3 Indian states and are observed over a 6-year period from 2010-2015, 
leading to 1,540 observations.
15
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
included in the analysis. It can be noted that the variation in maximum and minimum values 
for all the parameters and the standard deviation for selected parameters of the sample 
utilities is large indicating that considerable differences exist in operational characteristics 
and sizes within utilities as reflected by output variables. Note that the variables, supply hours 
show value as low as 0.1hrs and non-revenue water has a value as high as 90.5% (nrw) 
reflecting the current challenges facing the Indian urban water supply sector.
16
 
 
The correlation coefficients of the variables are presented in the Appendix B. The correlation 
among some technical variables, Capex, and Opex, are relatively large as expected in 
efficiency studies carried out for distribution networks. On the other hand, the correlation 
among other variables defining the quality of supply, service efficiency, financial viability 
and environmental sustainability including variables introduced as inefficiency determinants 
in the model are much smaller. 
                                                          
15
 The states included in the study are Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Chhattisgarh. During the period of data 
collection (August, 2017) from the database (PAS, 2017), only 3 states possessed information on input variables 
and a set of output variables which are classified in “access” grouping in the study. The scope of the analysis in 
this paper is therefore limited to three states. It should be noted that urban water supply services in India are 
managed by government, mostly through urban local bodies and the water supply utilities in the current study 
are operated by local government authorities (Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992). 
16
 This is a common situation in Indian cities, where most urban centers receive water every alternate day for 
few hours and in some cases after several days (Shaban and Sharma, 2007). In addition, water supplies in India 
suffer from heavy losses due to poor operation and maintenance and the absence of adequate metering 
(Kulshrestha et al, 2012). This pattern of figures (Table. 4) with respect to variables: supply hours (sh) and Non-
revenue water (nrw) can be observed in the empirical literature that focused on measuring performance of 
Indian urban water supplies (see Nag and Garg, 2013; Vishwakarma et al, 2016). 
17 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Operating Expenditure (Opex)* Mill. rupees 
(2011) 
44.17 157.77 393.99 1,668 
Capital Expenditure (Capex)* Mill. rupees 
(2011) 
45.35 225.95 0.001 4,303 
Total Water Connections (wconn) No. of 
Connections 
13,668 47,090 36 1,474,093 
Total Water Supplied (ws) MLD 23.27 102.700 0.10 2,000 
Ground Water (gw) % 22.48 33.32 0 100 
Supply Hours (sh) Hours 1.41 2.01 0.10 24 
Complaint Efficiency (compl_Eff) % 85.36 18.00 7.7 100 
Cost Recovery (cr) % 65.46 38.23 1.6 301.30 
Billing Efficiency (bill_eff) % 58.93 23.99 0.40 100 
Non-Revenue Water (nrw) % 25.16 12.54 0.90 90.5 
Quality of water supplied (ws_qlty) % 94.84 10.30 18.90 100 
Data source : PAS database, Available: www.pas.org.in  
Note: MLD= Million Litres per Day, *Opex and Capex are deflated using GDP deflator considering base year 
as 2011, No. of observations = 1,540. 
 
4 Results and Discussions 
 
In this section we present and discuss the parameter estimates of our output distance function. 
We alternatively use a Cobb-Douglas and a translog functional form and we follow the 
distributional assumptions from Aigner et al. (1977) (henceforth ALS model) for the 
inefficiency term. We also estimate the RSCFG model as described in Section 3.3.2, and as 
shown in Equation (11), that allows us to introduce inefficiency determinants. The dependent 
variable in the model is total amount of water supplied (ws). 
 
The first model to estimate is the ALS model assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
This model does not include inefficiency determinants. As expected from an output distance 
function, the coefficients of all output variables are positive and mostly significant. Similarly, 
the coefficients of the input variables are negative and statistically significant. The 
coefficients of the state dummy variables are not significant, indicating that the differences 
among the three states have no considerable impact on the performance of their respective 
18 
 
utilities.
17
 The parameter estimates of the models are presented in Table 5. The second model 
is an output distance function with a translog specification in which we do not incorporate 
inefficiency determinants either. Overall, the model behaves in a similar fashion as the Cobb-
Douglas with slight changes noted in first-order coefficients and significance levels of a 
certain variables. 
 
The first-order coefficient of the output variable, Non-Revenue Water (nrw) changes sign 
from positive in the ALS model with Cobb-Douglas specification to negative when the 
translog specification is used and remains significant in both cases. The variable does not 
show the expected sign in the Cobb-Douglas specification but behaves well under the 
translog specification. The negative sign in the translog model indicates that as non-revenue 
water increases, the total water supplied also increases. This is an expected outcome as non-
revenue water, which includes both physical and apparent losses, is an undesirable by-
product. On the other hand, in the translog specification, the first-order coefficient of the 
outputs complaint efficiency (compl_eff) and groundwater (gw) are significant while the 
coefficient of the time trend variable (t) is no longer significant.  
 
The coefficients of the interactions of the time trend with some variables are significant in the 
translog specification, implying that they reflect some non-neutral technical change. This can 
be specifically observed in non-revenue water (nrw) and ground water (gw) variables. The 
coefficients of both variables change their signs relative to their first-order coefficients when 
interacted with the time trend. The negative sign of the coefficient of the interaction between 
ground water and the trend indicates that, over time, reduction in the ground water share 
results in more reduction in total water supplied. Similarly, the positive sign of the coefficient 
of the nrw with trend implies that, over time, reduction in non-revenue water results in less 
reduction in total water supplied. The estimates of other variables seem to be robust as all the 
first-order coefficients of output and input variables remain significant with the expected 
signs, while most of the interactions between variables are also significant. 
  
                                                          
17
 Major Institutional and financial reforms are introduced in the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat among them 
proposals for public-private partnership for water infrastructure and maintenance (see Wagle et al., 2011; NIUA, 
2015; IIHS, 2014). The types of reforms introduced vary in different states and there are considerable 
differences among them in terms of geography, availability of water resources and rainfall patterns, among other 
things. This heterogeneity is controlled through the state dummy variables in our study. 
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Table 5. Parameter estimates of the models 
 
 
ALS 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
ALS 
(TL) 
RSCFG (TL) 
Model I 
RSCFG (TL) 
Model II 
Variables  
Dep. Var., -log (ws) 
Est. 
Std. 
Err. 
Est. 
Std. 
Err. 
Est. 
Std. 
Err. 
Est. 
Std. 
Err. 
Frontier         
Intercept -2.109*** 0.077 -1.611*** 0.064 -1.994*** 0.068 -1.788*** 0.058 
log wconn 0.564*** 0.023 0.647*** 0.024 0.644*** 0.023 0.638*** 0.022 
gw 0.001 0.001 0.033*** 0.004 0.031*** 0.004 0.031*** 0.004 
log sh 0.233*** 0.012 0.223*** 0.011 0.216*** 0.011 0.200*** 0.010 
compl_eff 0.000 0.004 0.017* 0.008 0.017* 0.009 0.015* 0.008 
bill_eff 0.002 0.002 0.031*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.007 0.004 0.007 
cr 0.007*** 0.001 0.061*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.004 0.030*** 0.004 
nrw 0.016*** 0.002 -0.050*** 0.013 -0.005 0.018 -0.039*** 0.012 
log opex -0.612*** 0.014 -0.591*** 0.014 -0.609*** 0.014 -0.629*** 0.013 
log capex -0.013* 0.007 -0.023*** 0.006 -0.020*** 0.006 -0.017*** 0.006 
t 0.016** 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005 
½ (log wconn)
2
 
  
0.235*** 0.029 0.234*** 0.029 0.262*** 0.028 
½ (log sh)
 2
 
  
0.077*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.015 0.008 0.015 
½ compl_eff
2
 
  
-0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
½ bill_eff
2
 
  
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
½ cr
2
 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
½ gw
2
 
  
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
½ nrw
2
 
  
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.003 
½ (log opex)
2
 
  
-0.008 0.02 -0.031 0.021 -0.100*** 0.020 
½ (log capex)
2
 
  
-0.003 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 
½ t
2
 
  
0.000 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.007 
log wconn · log sh 
  
-0.069*** 0.02 -0.093*** 0.021 -0.085*** 0.021 
log wconn · compl_eff 
  
0.005 0.015 0.002 0.017 -0.013 0.016 
log wconn · bill_eff 
  
-0.039*** 0.012 -0.019 0.013 -0.017 0.012 
log wconn · cr 
  
0.027*** 0.008 0.034*** 0.009 0.019** 0.009 
log wconn · gw 
  
-0.014 0.009 -0.015 0.009 -0.008 0.009 
log wconn · nrw 
  
-0.048** 0.021 -0.058*** 0.021 -0.081*** 0.020 
log sh · compl_eff 
  
0.021** 0.01 0.017 0.010 0.007 0.010 
log sh · bill_eff 
  
0.013* 0.006 0.008 0.007 -0.011* 0.006 
log sh · cr 
  
0.011** 0.004 0.015*** 0.004 0.004 0.004 
log sh · gw 
  
0.008 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.005 
log sh · nrw 
  
0.025** 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 
compl_eff · bill_eff 
  
0.000 0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
compl_eff · cr 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
compl_eff · gw 
  
0.000 0 -0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
compl_eff · nrw 
  
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
bill_eff · cr 
  
0.001* 0 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
bill_eff · gw 
  
0.000 0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
bill_eff · nrw 
  
0.002* 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 
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cr · gw 
  
0.001*** 0 0.001*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 
cr · nrw 
  
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
gw · nrw 
  
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
log opex · log capex 
 
-0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.008 0.005 0.007 
log wconn · log opex 
  
-0.049** 0.023 -0.070*** 0.023 -0.096*** 0.022 
log wconn · log capex 
  
0.026* 0.013 0.007 0.014 0.018 0.013 
log sh · log opex 
  
0.067*** 0.014 0.038** 0.015 -0.017 0.014 
log sh · log capex 
  
-0.025*** 0.006 -0.018*** 0.007 -0.006 0.007 
compl_eff · log opex 
 
0.016 0.012 0.012 0.011 -0.001 0.012 
compl_eff · log capex 
 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.004 
bill_eff · log opex 
  
-0.008 0.008 -0.007 0.008 -0.019** 0.008 
bill_eff · log capex 
  
0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007** 0.004 
cr · log opex 
  
-0.023*** 0.004 -0.019*** 0.004 -0.022*** 0.004 
cr · log capex 
  
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
gw · log opex 
  
-0.008 0.005 -0.016*** 0.006 -0.020*** 0.005 
gw · log capex 
  
-0.003 0.002 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.005*** 0.002 
nrw · log opex 
  
0.046** 0.018 0.001 0.017 0.008 0.015 
nrw · log capex 
  
0.011 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.017*** 0.007 
log wconn · t 
  
-0.004 0.013 -0.011 0.013 -0.001 0.012 
log sh · t 
  
-0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.006 
compl_eff · t 
  
0.007* 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.004 
bill_eff · t 
  
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 
cr · t 
  
0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
gw · t 
  
-0.005* 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 
nrw · t 
  
0.019*** 0.006 0.016** 0.007 0.016*** 0.006 
log opex · t 
  
-0.004 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.007 
log capex · t 
  
0.008** 0.003 0.007** 0.004 0.005 0.003 
SD1 0.053 0.073 0.043 0.063 -0.012 0.062 -0.042 0.058 
SD2 0.064 0.072 0.054 0.062 0.019 0.061 -0.015 0.057 
Noise Term (σv
2
) -1.961*** 0.087 -2.252*** 0.065 -2.394*** 0.111 -2.263*** 0.039 
         
Inefficiency term 
(Variance)    
     
Intercept -1.871*** 0.217 -3.533*** 0.234 -2.252*** 0.285 -6.308*** 0.596 
ws_qlty 
   
 -0.030*** 0.006   
cr 
   
   -0.103*** 0.013 
bill_eff 
   
   -0.020*** 0.006 
nrw 
    
0.019** 0.008 
 
 
Observations 1,540 1,540 1,540 1,540 
Log-Likelihood -928.887 -638.091 -618.378 -515.129 
Chi-squared LR test 
 
(Degrees of freedom) 
581.592*** 
 
(54) 
39.426*** Model I 
245.924*** Model II 
(2) 
- - 
Significance code: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test allows us to compare nested models such as those estimated 
here (i.e., Cobb-Douglas vs translog, and ALS vs RSCFG).
18
 The values of the LR test are 
presented in Table 5 and show a value of 581.59 when the first two models are compared 
indicating that the Cobb-Douglas specification is rejected over the translog specification. 
Therefore, we use the translog specification to estimate the RSCFG model that incorporates 
inefficiency determinants. In addition, if we compare the two RSCFG models against the 
ALS model with translog specification, the ALS translog model is rejected over both RSCFG 
models and hence these are our preferred models. 
 
The parameter estimates in the frontier of Model I and Model II have in general similar signs 
and order of magnitude to those in the ALS model with a translog specification. Nevertheless, 
incorporation of inefficiency determinants changes the significance levels of two output 
variables, Non-revenue water (nrw) in Model I and billing efficiency (bill_eff) in Model II, in 
the frontier, as these variables are introduced as inefficiency determinants in respective 
models and show their effect in the inefficiency term.
19
 However, the significance of the cost 
recovery (cr) variable remains the same in the frontier and shows its effect in the inefficiency 
term. This result seems to suggest that it is preferable to include the cost recovery variable 
both as an explanatory variable in the frontier and as an inefficiency determinant. However, 
in case we have to choose, the variables Non-revenue water (nrw) and billing efficiency 
(bill_eff) should be introduced as inefficiency determinants rather than as variables to define 
the frontier of best-performance. 
 
For the variable groundwater (gw), used as an sustainability indicator, the first-order 
coefficient in Model I and Model II is positive and significant. This shows the dependence of 
the water utilities on groundwater sources which also makes the sector environmentally 
unsustainable in the long run. These findings are in line with the current situation where more 
than 80% of India’s drinking water needs are served by groundwater resources (Planning 
Commission, 2012) as surface water sources are depleted (due to low and moderate rainfall) 
                                                          
18
 Cobb-Douglas is a special case of translog in which the second-order parameters are equal to zero. In 
addition, from comparing Equations (11) and (10) we can observe that the ALS model is similar to an RSCFG 
model in which the δ-parameters associated to the inefficiency determinants are assumed to be equal to zero. For 
further details on this discussion, see Lai and Huang (2010). 
19
 Non-revenue water and billing efficiency are introduced in the distance function in the form of ratios 
normalised by the output total water supplied. The additional incorporation of these outputs separately (i.e., 
without being normalised) as inefficiency determinants (is standard in the SFA literature and) does not yield any 
econometric problem derived from collinearity. 
22 
 
and polluted in many urban areas (due to unregulated waste disposals) creating pressure on 
urban aquifers which are not recharged. These findings are in line with those of Olmstead 
(2010) where, in a literature survey on economics of managing scarce water resources 
highlights that urbanisation has a negative impact on groundwater recharge and reduces the 
ability of urban areas to withstand drought. This further raise concerns over the limits of 
groundwater withdrawals and calls for action to manage the water bodies.
20
 
 
The variable supply hours (sh) is an output and its coefficient is significant and positive in 
both models using the RSCFG specification of the inefficiency term. This is of relevance to 
design engineers and utility managers who often assume that intermittent water supplies are 
economical and need less water than the continuous ones, which may not be true. Kulshrestha 
et al. (2012) argue that restricted time supplies result in capital lock-up since the required 
water will be supplied in a limited time necessitating a higher diameter network.
21
 Also, 
alternative cycles of supplies and cut-offs lead to greater maintenance requirement for the 
distribution networks and higher operations and maintenance costs. Additionally, although 
governing authorities frequently resort to supply cuts as a rationing method to limit water 
consumption the estimates from Roibas et al. (2007) and Roibas et al. (2018) suggest that 
supply cuts had a higher impact on consumer welfare losses than price rationing. Accordingly, 
supply interruptions do not seem to be the preferred rationing method in terms of welfare. 
 
The findings of the present study on supply hours (sh) are in line with those of Roibas et al. 
(2007; 2018) and is of relevance to both developed and developing countries facing water 
supply interruptions whose rationing policies frequently include supply cuts as a means to 
conserve water. Thus, designing the network for continuous supply is a viable option 
considering its overall effect on utilities’ performance. Similarly, the outputs cost recovery 
(cr) and complaint efficiency (compl_eff), which are often not a priority for local authorities, 
show significant positive impact on utilities’ performance in both models. 
                                                          
20
 The situation warrants immediate attention, particularly with respect to drinking water security especially 
when no comprehensive legal framework is in place for regulating groundwater withdrawals (Kulshrestha et al., 
2012). In terms of water security, urban centres need to recognise that current levels of water use are 
unsustainable, and policies need to develop action plans to manage and preserve water bodies and replenish 
groundwater sources rather than exploiting shrinking reserves. 
21
 Note that water supplies in India are predominately intermittent and network size is the highest expenditure 
(sometimes over 70% of total asset cost) (Tynan and Kingdom, 2002), and hence pipe diameters on the field 
matter with respect to initial investments. Further, it was found that the value of peak factor (used in the design 
of networks) under intermittent supply varied from 2 to 6.4, in contrast to the range of 1.66-3 for continuous 
supplies, depending upon duration of supply and carrying capacity of the system (Paramasivam, 2017). 
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Additionally, we observe that all the variables in the inefficiency term in Model I and Model 
II are significant and show the expected sign. The coefficient of the variable ws_qlty in 
Model I is negative and significant. This implies that as the quality of water supplied 
increases, inefficiency declines, or in other words, i.e., efficiency augments. On the other 
hand, the variable Non-revenue water (nrw) in Model I is positive and significant. This 
implies that as the Non-revenue water (nrw) increases, inefficiency increases, or in other 
words, efficiency declines. Furthermore, the coefficients of the variables cr and bill_eff in 
Model II are negative and significant. This implies that as the cost recovery and billing 
efficiency increases, inefficiency declines, or in other words, efficiency increases. 
 
It should be noted that the variables Non-revenue water (nrw), cost recovery (cr) and billing 
efficiency (bill_eff) show significant impact on utilities’ performance in the frontier under 
translog specification and when introduced as inefficiency determinants under the RSCFG 
specification. This implies a well-defined relationship exist between these variables and the 
performance of utilities in the sector. It further highlights the need for utility managers and 
local authorities to focus on improving cost recovery, billing efficiency and reducing losses 
(non-revenue water) to achieve service delivery targets, expand coverage and induce 
efficiency measures in the sector. Some countries have managed to improve such indicators 
in their utilities sectors (see WBG, 2009; WBG, 2016; WSP, 2008). However, the current 
institutional set ups in Indian urban water sector, characterised by the absence of effective 
regulator makes it difficult to benchmark the performance of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) 
within and across states leaving minimal incentives for local authorities and utility managers 
to improve performance. Therefore, it is imperative to establish national level regulatory 
authority, strengthen institutions and governance capacities as a prerequisite to these potential 
improvements. 
 
Finally, the first-order coefficient of the time trend variable (t) is not significant in the 
RSCFG models. As in the case of the ALS model with the translog specification, the 
coefficients of some interactions of the time trend with other variables are significant, what 
reflects the existence of non-neutral technical change. 
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Figure 1 presents the evolution of efficiency scores in our preferred (RSCFG) models. Note 
that the two RSCFG models show similar pattern of results albeit different efficiency levels. 
These models do not clearly show convergence or divergence in utilities’ performance over 
time during the analysed period. Overall, the evolution of the performance scores suggests 
that no significant change in the level of efficiencies is noted during the period of analysis in 
the two models. This indicates that little focus has been laid on efficiency improvements and 
that policies are directed towards achieving quality and quantity targets though not on 
creating the incentives to improve operating and service efficiencies.
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Figure 1. Annual evolution of efficiency in water distribution 
 
These results are different to those by Nyathikala and Kulshrestha (2017), who analysed the 
performance of 21 Indian urban water supply utilities for the period 1999 and 2010 using a 
non-parametric DEA method. They found a decline in the average performance of water 
supply utilities over the analysed period. The difference in the results may be due to diverse 
reasons such as the application of an alternative approach, the analysis of another sample 
period and group utilities, or the incorporation of socio-economic and environmental aspects 
in the present study to measure the technical efficiency of water supply utilities. 
                                                          
22
 Major central government policies from 2002-2017 emphasis on extending water services to uncovered 
populations and rationalising water tariffs to recover operating and maintenance costs (see Locussol et al., 2006; 
TERI, 2010, NITI Aayog, 2017), no major focus has been laid on improving operational and service efficiencies 
of utilities. Although, thirteenth finance commission (2010-2015) of India (a unique Indian federal structure 
appointed every five years with the intension to share resources between the centre and state), recommended 
performance grants (FCI, 2009) to improve service level benchmarks (MoUD, 2009) for urban local bodies 
(ULBs), only few states qualify and claim the grant (see NIUA, 2018). 
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5 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Since the past decade and a half, India has seen major reform efforts in water supply sector 
on economic and institutional fronts. These reforms are based on the principles of 
rationalising water tariffs with a view to achieve full cost recovery, introducing public-private 
partnerships and establishing state regulatory authorities to achieve universal and equitable 
access to clean and safe drinking water as mandated by major central government policies. 
 
At the same time, literature suggests that quality of institutions have an impact on the 
performance of utilities and constrain them from realising their technical potential. In such a 
case, utilities operating under fragmented set ups and politically dominant environments can 
face constraints over achieving reform objectives. Indian urban water supply sector provides 
a suitable case to examine the performance of utilities operating in such an environment. 
Moreover, studies that depict a complete picture of Indian urban water supply services are 
missing so far, and this paper attempts to understand the state of utilities considering socio-
economic and environmental perspectives. 
 
We use a recent dataset and a set of stochastic frontier models to estimate a multi-input-
multi-output distance function in order to analyse the production characteristics and 
performance of Indian urban water supply utilities. The paper further focuses on determining 
the effect of specific factors on utilities’ performance. The results show that an increase in 
supply reliability, service efficiency and financial viability of utilities improves their 
performance. In addition, the results show that utilities need to focus on reducing non-
revenue water, which has a negative impact on the utilities’ performance. Furthermore, 
utilities should reduce their dependence on utilisation of groundwater sources and develop 
action plans to manage water bodies. 
 
Even though the focus of utilities and local authorities so far is to achieve social objectives 
(e.g., coverage targets), our results show that focusing on economic factors and 
environmental dimensions would not only help utilities achieve their social objectives, but 
also helps the financial and environmental sustainability of the sector. This holds also the 
case of other utility networks operating under politically dominant environments. Therefore, 
utility managers and local authorities should improve cost recovery, billing efficiency and 
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reduce their losses (non-revenue water) which have a significant impact on their performance. 
This helps the utilities achieve service delivery targets, expand coverage and induce 
efficiency in the sector. This, in turn, establishes a trade-off between socioeconomic and 
environmental objectives ensuring sustainability in the sector. Policymakers should consider 
these factors and design economic incentives to improve the performance of water utilities 
enabling them to achieve their social objectives and long-term sustainability. 
 
The paper also expresses concern over the current institutional set ups in Indian urban water 
sector, characterised by the absence of effective regulator leaving minimal incentives for 
local authorities and utility managers to improve performance. The study therefore highlights 
the need to establish and mandate national level regulatory authorities, strengthen the 
institutions and governance capacities as a prerequisite to achieve the above-mentioned 
potential improvements. 
 
The Indian water supply sector can learn from their counterparts in other utility sectors such 
as electricity, gas and telecom and establish a central independent regulatory commission. 
The national level regulatory commission can in turn coordinate with state-level water 
regulatory authorities and monitor the performance of utilities across states. Moreover, the 
establishment of state water regulatory authorities should be mandated in all the states and be 
given legally defined powers. The powers of state water regulatory authorities should extend 
from allocating and regulating water resources to regulating water service provisioning, act as 
a tariff setting authority and limit political intervention. Further, there is an urgent need to 
establish performance benchmarking systems in the Indian water supply sector to help 
oversee the functioning of urban local bodies within the states, build accountability, 
transparency and track the progress of reform programs. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Definitions of variables 
Indicator Definitions 
Operating Expenses 
OPEX (Rs) 
Expenses incurred in operating water utility. It includes the following 
expenses: 
 
Regular staff and administration expenses + Contract staff costs + Electricity 
charges+ Chemicals cost + Repair/Maintenance cost + Bulk water charges + 
Other costs 
Capital Expenditure 
CAPEX (Rs)  
Expenditure invested by water utility in development projects and schemes. It 
includes following expenditure: 
 
Projects, Schemes + Principle repayment of loans + Other expenses 
Total water supplied 
(MLD) 
Total water supplied to the customers expressed in Million litres per day. 
Total Water 
connections (No.s) 
Total number of connections to the water supply network with a private 
service connection. 
Continuity of supply 
(Hrs)  
Continuity of supply is measured as average number of hours of pressurised 
water supply per day. 
Complaint Efficiency 
(%) 
Total number of water supply related complaints redressed within time as 
stipulated in service charter of the ULB, as a percentage of the total number 
of water supply related complaints received in the year. 
Cost Recovery (%)  
Percentage of total operating revenues from water supply related charges to 
total operating expenses on water supply. 
Billing Efficiency 
(%) 
Percentage of current year revenues collected from water supply related taxes 
and charges as a percentage of total billed amount (for water supply). 
Non-Revenue Water 
(%) 
Difference between total water produced (ex-treatment plant) and total water 
sold expressed as a percentage of total water produced. 
 
Non-revenue water includes: a) consumption which is authorised but not 
billed, such as public stand posts; b) apparent losses such as illegal water 
connections, water theft and metering inaccuracies; c) real losses which are 
leakages in the transmission and distribution networks. 
Ground water (%) Percentage of ground water extracted to total water supplied. 
Quality of water 
supplied (%) 
Percentage of water samples that meet standards at treatment plant outlet and 
consumer end. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1: Correlation matrix of variables 
 
opex capex wconn ws gw sh compl_eff cr bill_eff nrw ws_qlty 
opex 1 0.52 0.70 0.91 -0.12 0.28 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 
capex 0.52 1 0.34 0.53 -0.08 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 
wconn 0.70 0.34 1 0.67 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
ws 0.91 0.53 0.67 1 -0.09 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.09  0.07 0.05 
gw -0.12 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 1 0.02 0.12 -0.03 -0.08 0 0 
sh 0.28 0.13 0.14 0.25 0.02 1 0.13 0.14 0.19 -0.03 0.05 
compl_eff -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.13 1 0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.09 
cr 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.14 0.05 1 0.01 -0.04 0.06 
bill_eff 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 -0.08 0.19 0.13 0.01 1 -0.17 0.11 
nrw 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.07 0 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.17 1 -0.09 
ws_qlty 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.11 -0.09 1 
 
